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Stable Nash Equilibria in the Gale-Shapley Matching Game
Sushmita Gupta∗ Kazuo Iwama∗ Shuichi Miyazaki∗
Abstract
In this article we study the stable marriage game induced by the men-proposing Gale-
Shapley algorithm. Our setting is standard: all the lists are complete and the matching
mechanism is the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. It is well known that in this
setting, men cannot cheat, but women can. In fact, Teo, Sethuraman and Tan [TST01],
show that there is a polynomial time algorithm to obtain, for a given strategy (the set of all
lists) Q and a woman w, the best partner attainable by changing her list. However, what if
the resulting matching is not stable with respect to Q? Obviously, such a matching would
be vulnerable to further manipulation, but is not mentioned in [TST01]. In this paper,
we consider (safe) manipulation that implies a stable matching in a most general setting.
Specifically, our goal is to decide for a given Q, if w can manipulate her list to obtain a
strictly better partner with respect to the true strategy P (which may be different from Q),
and also the outcome is a stable matching for P .
1 Introduction
Matchings under preferences is an extensively studied area of theoretical and empirical research
that has a wide range of applications in economics and social sciences. The most popular and
standard problem in this field is the stable marriage problem (SMP), introduced by Gale and
Shapley [GS62], where we have two parties; a set of men and a set of women. Each man has
a preference list that orders women according to his preference, and similarly each woman also
has a preference ordering for the men. The goal is to find a stable matching, a matching without
any blocking pair, where a blocking pair is a pair of a man and a woman who prefer each other
to their current partners.
The goal of each player is of course to obtain a good partner (to steal a good partner from
colleagues). Thus, the stable marriage is a typical game played by selfish players and its game-
theoretic aspects have been studied for a long time (see Roth and Sotomayor [RS90]). For
instance, it is well known that if we use the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm (GS-M, in
short) as the matching mechanism, then men do not benefit by cheating, i.e. ., any change of
a single list on the men’s side does not give him a strictly better partner. Also, if we allow
individuals to truncate their lists (i.e. delete one or more persons from the list), then there are
several (relatively easy) ways to manipulate to obtain a better outcome.
For the special case, when all lists are complete, we have known about instances of SMP
(see page 65 of [GI89], for example), where a woman can improve her outcome by permuting
her true preference list, while all others use their true lists. But little else was known about
the property of permutation strategies, such as the time complexity of finding such a list. It
is due to the work of Teo et al. [TST01] that this question was resolved. They proved that
there is a poly-time algorithm to obtain, for a given set of complete preference lists for all men
and women, and a particular woman w, the best partner that w can attain by using one of
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the n! permutations of her true preference list. As a corollary, it is also possible to decide in
polynomial time if the set of true preference lists is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, [TST01] was
a nice start towards progress in this topic and their proof is also nontrivial. However, their
setting that there is no distinction between the “true” preference list of a player and the actual
preference list submitted by him/her, is not standard in game theory. This is supported by
theory, by the result that there is no mechanism in which the best strategy for all the agents
is to tell the truth [RS90, Thm 4.4]. For GS-M it is in the best interest for the men to tell the
truth, but that is not the case for the women. Hence, we have to consider the possibility that
true preference is different from stated preference.
Recall that in the general setting of game theory, we have a set of players and their strategies.
The outcome of each player i for his/her strategy si, is determined by a function of si and all the
other players’ strategies. In the case of stable marriage, the strategy of each player is his/her
preference list, and that can be one of n! different ones and the player’s outcome is determined
by final matched partner at the end of the matching algorithm, (GS-M in our case). The true
preference list is necessary for assessing an agent’s profit or loss; the actual stated strategy
(submitted list) may of course be very different from the true list. In other words, a stated list
of a woman w and her true lists are effectively independent; the latter is necessary for computing
the quality (i.e. benefit, if any) of the outcome for w, and as it turns out, has another important
role.
Consider the strategies depicted in Figure 1: We have five men {1, . . . , 5}, five women
{a, . . . , e}, and their current preference lists, given by Q1. Recall that each person has his/her
true preference list, and that is depicted by P in the table. We want to see how vulnerable
Q1 is against manipulation. GS-M applied to Q1 yields µQ1 = {(1, a), (2, b), (3, c), (4, d), (5, e)},
which is stable with respect to P (called P -stable), since µP = µQ1 . However, it is not stable
in the Nash equilibrium sense, since d can improve her outcome by changing her list to Q2(d),
resulting in µQ2 = {(1, a), (2, b), (3, c), (4, e), (5, d)}. Her new partner 5 is better than 4 in terms
of P (d) and the matching is again P -stable. It is noteworthy that µQ2 is the women-optimal
P -stable matching, hence it admits no P -stable manipulation strategies.
But then again, another woman a gets into the game, against Q2, and using Q3(a). Her
new partner is 2, who is ranked first in her true list.Unfortunately, though, µQ3 is not P -stable,
with blocking pairs (2, b) and (3, b). This leaves open the possibility of manipulation by b,
given by Q4(b), whereby b is matched to 2, and a to 3. Thus, a actually has a lower payoff in
Q4 than Q2, thus rendering her manipulating of Q3 counter-productive. This is why we posit
that manipulation strategies that are P -stable add a layer of security for the manipulation, since
unstable manipulation will always leave open the possibility of others to manipulate, specifically
those women who are in a P -blocking pair.
Our Contributions: Motivated by these strategic considerations, we introduce a stable Nash
equilibrium, which is a relaxation of a Nash equilibrium, but nonetheless sufficiently limits an
agent’s incentive to manipulate the market. Suppose that the stable matching game is induced
by the men-optimal stable matching mechanism. For a given strategy Q and a true strategy
P , Q is said to be a P-stable Nash equilibrium (in this game) if and only if there is no woman
w such that (i) w can manipulate her list, (while all others retain their Q-lists) and obtain a
better partner with respect to P (w), and (ii) the resulting matching is P -stable. Note that there
are several cases that people may try to improve their outcome but actually fail under (i) and
(ii). For instance, (a) w manipulates her list, and indeed gets matched to x, who is better with
respect to Q, but not with respect to P , and (b) w manipulates her list, gets indeed a better
partner x with respect to P , but the resulting matching is not P -stable, for instance Q3, in our
example.
Our main result in this paper is the existence of a polynomial time algorithm that determines
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Men P (M) Women P (W ) Q1(W )
1 : a b d e c a : 2 1 4 5 3 2 1 4 5 3
2 : b a d e c b : 2 3 1 4 5 1 2 4 5 3
3 : a b d e c c : 1 2 4 5 3 1 2 4 5 3
4 : d e a b c d : 5 4 1 2 3 5 4 1 2 3
5 : e d a b c e : 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3
True strategy P = (P (M), P (W )) and stated strategy Q1 = (P (M), Q1(W ). The M -optimal matching
µP = µQ1 = {(1, a), (2, b), (3, c), (4, d), (5, e)}, thus, µQ1 is P -stable.
Men P (M) Women Q2(W ) Q3(W ) Q4(W )
1 : a b d e c a : 2 1 4 5 3 2 3 1 4 5 2 3 1 4 5
2 : b a d e c b : 1 2 4 5 3 1 2 4 5 3 2 3 1 4 5
3 : a b d e c c : 1 2 4 5 3 1 2 4 5 3 1 2 4 5 3
4 : d e a b c d : 5 3 4 1 2 5 3 4 1 2 5 3 4 1 2
5 : e d a b c e : 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3
The P -blocking pairs in µQ3 are (2, b) and (3, b). Manipulation by b gives Q4 = (Q3(−b), P (b)), resulting
in µQ4 = {(1, c), (2, b), (3, a), (4, d), (5, e)}.
Figure 1: Manipulation by d, followed by a, and then b.
if Q is a P -stable Nash equilibrium. Our algorithm has two stages. In the first stage we obtain
triples (w, x,Q(x;w)), where w is a woman, x(6= µQ[w]) is a man, and Q(x;w) is a list of w such
that µ(Q(−w),Q(x;w)) matches x to w. Here, the preference lists (Q(−w), Q(w, x)), is such that
only w’s list is changed to Q(x;w), while each a ∈M ∪W \{w} uses Q(a) (formal definitions in
Section 2). It should be noted that there may be many different lists of w that if used instead,
would also match w to x, but this algorithm outputs just one of them. The algorithm itself is
basically the same as [TST01], but the analysis is completely new. Recall that [TST01] only
guarantees that it outputs a similar triple (w, x,Q(x;w)), where x is the best possible partner
of w (with respect to Q(w)). Our arguments are completely new, proving the more general
statement, that all partners attainable by GS-M can be found using the algorithm.
The second stage is to decide, for each triple (w, x,Q(x;w)) obtained in the first stage,
whether or not there exists a list for w, say Q′(x;w), which if used instead of Q(w) would
result in w to x, with the condition that µ(Q(−w),Q′(x;w)) is P -stable. List Q(x;w) is an obvious
candidate for such a Q′(x;w), but there may be (exponentially) many others, and it is possible
that Q′(x;w) results in a P -stable matching but Q(x;w) does not. For this, we prove a key
lemma that is interesting in its own right. Specifically, we show that µ(Q(−w),Q′(x;w)) is unique
regardless of the list Q′(x;w). Therefore, to detect if Q is P -stable Nash equilibrium, it suffices
to check if µ(Q(−w),Q(x;w)) is P -stable for all the (at most n
2) triples obtained in the first stage.
Related Work: We denote the true preferences of (M,W ) by P , and for an individual agent
a ∈M ∪W , the preference list of a by P (a). The M -optimal and W -optimal matching w.r.t a
given strategy Q is denoted by µQ.
For a stated strategy Q, Dubins and Freedman [DF81], proved that there is no coalition C
of men, who have a manipulation strategy P ′ = (P (−C), P ′(C)) so that the outcome P ′-stable,
and is strictly better than µP , in P (m), for each m ∈ C. Demange, et al. [DGS87] extend this
result to include women in the coalition C, showing that there is no P ′-stable matching µ′ such
that every agent a ∈ C, prefers µ′[a], (in P (a)) to his/her partner in every P -stable matching.
For truncation strategies it was shown by Gale and Sotomayor [GS85] that if there are
at least two P -stable matchings, then there is a woman w who has a unilateral manipulation
strategy Q′ ∈ Qw that gives a strictly better outcome than µP , in P (w). If C = W , then there
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is a truncation strategy P ′ = (P (M), P ′(W )), such that µP ′ , is the women-optimal matching
for P . Considerable work on truncation strategies have been undertaken, see [Ehl08, RR99]
for motivations and applications. In fact, up until the late 1980s, analyses of manipulation
strategies of women centred almost exclusively around truncation strategies.
As stated earlier, (to the best of our knowledge) Teo et al. [TST01] was the first to consider
permutations of a agent’s true lists as a type of manipulation strategy. They gave a polynomial
time algorithm that for a given w ∈W , computes the best manipulated partner (in P (w)) that
w can attain using GS-M on any strategy (P (−w), P ′(w)) ∈ Pw.
Immorlica and Mahidian [IM05], allowing the men’s preference lists to have ties but bounded
by a constant, and drawn from an arbitrary probability distribution, while the women’s lists
are arbitrary and complete; show that with high probability, truthfulness is the best strategy
for an any agent, assuming everybody is being truthful as well.
Kobayashi and Matsui [KM10] consider the possibility that a coalition C of women have
a manipulation strategy P ′ = (P (M), P ′(W )), containing complete lists, such that µP ′ yields
specific partnerships for the members of C. The situation manifests in two specific forms,
depending on the nature of the input. In the first case, the input consists of the complete
lists of all men, a partial matching (some agents may be unmatched) µ′, and complete lists
of the subset of women who are unmatched in µ′, denoted by W \ C. The problem is to test
whether there exists a permutation strategy for each woman in C, such that for the combined
strategy P ′ = (P (−C), P ′(C)), µP ′ is a perfect matching that extends µ
′. In the second case,
the input consists of the lists of all men, a perfect matching µ, and lists for women in W \ C.
The problem is to test if there are permutation strategies for the women in C, such that for
P ′ = (P (−C), P ′(C)), matching µ′P = µ.
Pini et al. [PRVW11] show that for an arbitrary instance of the stable marriage problem,
there is a stable matching mechanism for which it is NP-hard to find a manipulation strategy.
More recently, Deng, et al. [DST15], drawing on [KM10] have discussed the possibility of a
coalition of women permuting their true lists, while others state theirs truthufully, so as to
produce a matching that is Pareto optimal for the members of the coalition. They also give an
O(n6) algorithm to compute a strong Nash equilibrium that is strongly Pareto optimal for all
the coalition partners.
Our work deals with manipulation by women, in the game induced by GS-M, where truth-
telling is the best strategy for men. For a background on manipulation strategies for men, we
point the reader to [Hua06, III+13] and [Man13].
2 Preliminaries
We always use M to denote the set of n men {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} and W the set of n women
{w1, w2, . . . , wn}. Our matching mechanism is always the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algo-
rithm: On the man’s side, a man who is single, proposes to the woman who is at the top of
his current list. At the woman’s side, when a woman w receives a proposal from a man m, she
accepts that proposal if she is single. Otherwise, if she prefers m to her current partner m′ (m′
to m, resp.), then w accepts m (m′, resp.) and rejects m′ (m, resp.). If m is rejected by w,
then m becomes single again and w is removed from the m’s list. The algorithm terminates
when there is no single man (for more details, see [GI89]). We assume that if there are two or
more single men, the man with the smallest index does a proposal, thus making the procedure
deterministic.
A strategy Q is a set of preference lists (or simply lists) of all the men in M and all the
women in W . For a person x in M ∪W , Q(x) denotes the x’s list in the strategy Q. For a given
strategy Q, suppose that only w changes her list from Q(w) to Q′(w). We denote the resulting
strategy by Q′ = (Q(−w), Q′(w)), and use Qw to denote the family of all such strategy Q
′. Note
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that all lists considered in this article are complete,i.e. , they are permutations of n men or n
women.
Let µ be a (perfect) matching between M and W and Q be a strategy. Then we say that
µ is Q-stable if there is no Q-blocking pair. Here Q-blocking pair is a pair (m,w) of a man and
a woman such that m prefers, in (terms of the preference ordering in) Q(m), w to his partner
in µ (denoted by µ[m]) and w prefers, in Q(w), m to µ[w]. If w strictly prefers m1 to m2, in
Q(w), then we denote that as m1 > m2 in Q(w). We use m1 ≥ m2, if m1 > m2, or m1 = m2.
For a strategy Q, µQ denotes the man-optimal stable matching, computed by the Gale-
Shapley algorithm. If a man m proposes to a woman w during this procedure, then we say
that m is active in Q(w) (formally speaking we should say m is active in Q(w), during the
computation of µQ, but for the sake of brevity, we will omit strategy Q when it is obvious from
the context.)
Recall that a woman w changes her list Q(w) for the purpose of manipulation. For a subset
M ′ ⊆ M , let I be an ordering of men in M ′. Then, Q(I;w) denotes a permutation of Q(w),
where the men in M ′ are at the front in the order in which they appear in I. An ordered
(sub)list such as I, is called a tuple, and for any given tuple I, we define Q(I;w) = [I,Q(w) \ I]
For example, if Q(w) = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) and I = (5, 2), then Q(I;w) = (5, 2, 1, 3, 4, 6). Now we
are ready to introduce our main concept.
We are given a strategy Q and a true strategy P . Then for a woman w ∈ W , a strategy
Q′ ∈ Qw is said to be a unilateral manipulation strategy of w, if µQ′ [w] > µQ[w] in P (w), i.e. w
strictly prefers the outcome of µQ′ to µQ, with respect to her true preference/strategy. If µQ′
is a P -stable matching, then Q′ is said to be a P -stable manipulation strategy of w. A strategy
Q is said to be a P -stable Nash equilibrium if there does not exist w ∈ W having a P -stable
unilateral manipulation strategy Q′ ∈ Qw.
In this paper, we consider the following problem:
Problem: Given a true preference P , and a stated preference Q, determine if Q is a P -stable
Nash equilibrium.
3 Listing active men
Now our goal is to design an algorithm that, for two given strategies, a stated strategy Q and
a true strategy P , answers if Q is a P -stable Nash equilibrium. To do so, we first design an
algorithm that outputs the set Nw(Q) of all possible partners m of a given fixed woman w such
that there is a (manipulated) strategy Q′ = (Q(−w), Q′(w)), for which the men-optimal stable
matching (i.e. men-proposing GS algorithm), will match w to m. By using this algorithm n
times, we can obtain {Nw1(Q), . . . , Nwn(Q)}. The use of this set to prove our main result is
explained in the next section.
See Algorithm 1, which is basically the same as the one given by Teo et al. [TST01]: Suppose
that Q(w) = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) and the first proposal comes from man 5. Then the algorithm
adds 5 to N and call Explore(Q(5;w)), namely it executes men-proposing Gale-Shapley al-
gorithm (GS-M, in short) after moving man 5 to the front of Q(w). In general, procedure
Explore takes as a parameter, Q(x, I;w), a preference list of w. As per our notation, x is at
the front of this list, followed by the sublist I and then the rest of the men, thus, defining the
strategy Q′ = (Q(−w), Q(x, I;w)). Explore(Q(x, I;w)) executes GS-M for the strategy Q′ and
produces the set of men A who propose to w after x. Now for each y ∈ A, we check if y is “new”
(i.e. , not yet in N). If so, we add y to N and call Explore recursively after moving y to the
top of Q(x, I;w), else, we do nothing.
Since Explore is called only once for each man in N , its time complexity is obviously at
most n × T (GS), where T (GS) is the time complexity of one execution of GS-M, thus, overall
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it is O(n3). The nontrivial part is the correctness of the argument, which we shall prove now.
Theorem 1. For a strategy Q and a woman w ∈W , Algorithm 1 produces
N =
{
m ∈M | ∃Q′ ∈ Qw, s.t. µQ′ [w] = m
}
and for each m ∈ N , a list Q(m, I;w) such that
for some partial list I, m is active in Q(I;w).
Proof. Let Q′(w) be an arbitrary permutation of n men and Q′ be the strategy (Q(−w), Q′(w)).
It is enough to prove if a man x ∈ M proposes to w during the computation of µQ′ (i.e. x is
active in Q′(w)), then x is added to N during the execution of Algorithm 1.
Here we need two new definitions: Suppose that x1, x2, . . . , xt is a sequence of proposals
received by w during the computation of µQ′ . Then this sequence is called an active sequence
for Q′(w), denoted by AS′(w). Also suppose that y1, y2, . . . , ys is a maximal subsequence of
AS′(w) such that y1 = x1 and ys > ys−1 > · · · > y1 in Q
′(w). Then, this is called the
increasing active subsequence for Q′(w) and is denoted by IAS′(w). As an example, let Q′(w) =
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) and AS′(w) = 5, 6, 3, 4, 2, 8. Then IAS′(w) = 5, 3, 2. Now consider a
different list Q′′(w) = (1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 8, 4, 6, 7), thus, Q′(w) 6= Q′′(w). Then, we can observe that
the active sequence and the increasing active subsequence for Q′′(w) are identical to those of
Q′(w). The reason being the following. The lists in Q′ and Q′′ are the same except that of
w’s, so the first proposal for w must come from the same man regardless of w’s list. Since 5 is
accepted by w (both lists are complete), the next proposal should also be from the same man,
6. Now since 5 > 6 in both Q′(w) and Q′′(w), 6 is rejected in both Q′(w) and Q′′(w) and thus,
the next proposal must also be same, and so on, we continue. This observation leads us to the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. For strategies Q′, Q′′ ∈ Qw, let x1, x2, . . . , xp and u1, u2, . . . , uq, denote the active
sequences for Q′(w) and Q′′(w) respectively and let y1, y2, . . . , ys and v1, v2, . . . , vt denote the
corresponding increasing active subsequence. Then, the following conditions must hold.
(a) x1 = y1 = u1 = v1.
(b) For an arbitrary l (l ≤ p and l ≤ q), we consider the prefixes of the active sequences up
to position l and the prefixes of the corresponding increasing active subsequences, denoted
by y1, ..., yj and v1, ..., vj . Then, if xi = ui for all i ≤ l and yk = vk for all k ≤ j, then
xl+1 = ul+1.
Proof. By definition, x1 = y1 and u1 = v1. Recall that all the lists in Q
′ and Q′′ are the same
except those for w. Furthermore, we use a fixed tie-breaking protocol in the deterministic GS
algorithm. Hence, x1 = u1, follows directly.
To prove condition (b), let y2 = xi1+1, y3 = xi2+1, . . ., and so on. Then we can write AS
′(w)
as follows, where x2, . . . , xi1 , xi1+2, . . . , xi2 , . . . may be empty.
AS′(w) = y1, x2, . . . , xi1 , y2, xi1+2, . . . , xi2 , . . . , yj, xij−1+2, . . . , xl, xl+1, . . .
Now one can see that y1 is accepted, all of x2 . . . , xi1 are rejected since they are after y1 in
the list by definition. This continues as y2 is accepted, xi1+2, . . . , xi2 rejected, and so on. Now,
consider AS′′(w), depicted below.
AS′′(w) = v1, u2, . . . , ui1 , v2, ui1+2, . . . , ui2 , . . . , vj , uij−1+2, . . . , ul, ul+1, . . .
By the assumption, these two sequences are identical up to position l, so acceptance or
rejection for each proposal follows identically, as discussed above. Therefore, the configuration
(see below) of GS-M for Q′ at the moment when xl proposes to w and the configuration for
Q′′ when ul proposes to w are exactly the same. A configuration consists of (i) the lists of all
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men (recall that some entries are removed when proposals are rejected), (ii) the set of single
men, and (iii) the current temporal partner of each woman. (Formally this should be shown by
induction, but it is straight forward and may be omitted). Also the acceptance/rejection for xl
and ul is the same. Thus in either case, the execution of the (deterministic) GS-M is exactly
the same for Q′ and Q′′ until w receives proposal from xl+1 and ul+1, respectively. Hence, xl+1
and ul+1, should be equal and the lemma is proved.
Now let us look at the execution sequence of Algorithm 1 while comparing it with the
execution sequence of GS-M on Q′. We assume that the active sequence and increasingly active
sequence for Q′ are AS′(w) = x1, x2, . . . , xp and IAS
′(w) = y1, y2, . . . , ys, respectively. By 1,
the first proposal to w is always y1, so the algorithm starts with Explore(Q(y1;w)) (we simply
say the algorithm invokes Q(y1;w)), and N = {y1}, at the very beginning.
Now we note that it is quite easy to see that the active sequence for Q(y1;w) should be
y1, x2, . . . , xi1 , . . ., i.e. it should be identical to that of Q
′(w) up to the position i1. The reason
is as follows. We already know the first active man is always y1 and that is also the first symbol
in the increasing active sequence of both. Thus we can use 1, to conclude that the second
symbols should also be the same. Since, x2 is not in IAS
′(w), meaning that it is rejected, which
is also the same in Q(y1;w) since y1 is at the top of the sequence. Thus the third symbol is the
same in both and so on up to position i1. Then the next symbol in AS
′(w) is y2 and its that is
also active in Q(y1;w), meaning Q(y2, y1;w) is invoked by the algorithm. (The algorithm also
invokes Q(x2, y1;w), Q(x3, y1;w), . . . , Q(xi1 , y1;w) also, but these are not important for us at
this moment).
We again consider the active sequence for Q(y2, y1;w) and by the same argument presented
earlier, we can conclude that it is identical to AS′(w) up to position i2 and so y3 is found to be
an active man. Hence, Q(y3, y2, y1;w) is invoked if y3 was not already present in N .
Continuing like this, we note that if Q(ys, ys−1, . . . , y1;w) is invoked, then we are done since
its active sequence is identical to that of Q′(w). However, this case happens only if each yi,
2 ≤ i ≤ s, is a brand new active man found during the invocation of Q(yi−1, . . . , y1;w). If one
them is not new then the subsequent lists are not invoked, and yet, we are assured due to 2
that Algorithm 1 will detect all the active men in Q′(w).
2 is rather surprising and maybe of independent interest. For two lists Q′(w) and Q′′(w),
that are distinct and arbitrary orderings on men, we assume nothing about the execution of
GS-M on the two lists except that a particular man x is active in either list. Yet, we are able
to show that a man who proposes to w after x when Q′(x;w) is used, must also propose when
Q′′(x;w) is used. This result allows us to focus solely on active men that have been discovered
in the current invocation of Explore, thereby restricting the number of recursion steps to O(n).
Lemma 2. For strategies Q′ and Q′′ in Qw, suppose that x is active in both Q
′(w) and Q′′(w).
Then a man who is active in Q′(x;w) after x, is also active in Q′′(x;w).
Proof. Let y denote a man who is active in Q′(x;w) after x. Consider the following strategies,
Qy = (Q
′(−w), Q′(y, x;w)) and Qx = (Q
′′(−w), Q′′(x;w)),
and theM -optimal matchings denoted by µ1 and µ2, respectively; i.e. µ1[w] = y and µ2[w] = x.
The lists are complete, and Q(y) = P (y), so either µ2[y] > w, or w > µ2[y] in P (y). If
µ2[y] > w then matching µ2 is Qy-stable. Thus, both µ1 and µ2 are Qy-stable, with µ1 being
the men-optimal matching. But, then w = µ1[y] ≥ µ2[y] in P (y), contradicting the initial
assumption that µ2[y] > w. Therefore, we conclude that w > µ2[y] in P (y), implying that y
should propose to w before µ2[y] or that y is active inQ
′′(x;w). Hence, the proof is complete.
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The next lemma will complete the proof. Note that we are still using AS′(w), as given in
the proof of 1, and using that to define the following lists for w,
Q1(w) = Q1(y1;w), and Qj+1(w) = [yj+1, Qj(w) \ {yj}], for 1 ≤ j ≤ s− 1.
Lemma 3. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ s, the algorithm invokes Q(yj, I;w) for some tuple I and each
man in
{
xij−1+2, . . . , xij , yj+1
}
is active in it.
Proof. By induction. The base case is given by y1, for which it has been shown earlier that
Q(y1;w) is invoked at the beginning and every man in {x2, . . . , xi1 , y2} is active in Q(y1;w)
after y1. Thus, the base case has been proved.
Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds for yt, where t ≤ s − 2, i.e. for some tuple I,
Q(yt, I;w) is invoked, and each man in
{
xit−1+2, . . . , xit , yt+1
}
is active in it. We will complete
the proof by showing that the hypothesis holds for yt+1. If yt+1 is “new”, i.e. it is added to N
during the invocation of Q(yt, I;w), then Q(yt+1, yt, I;w), is invoked subsequently. Using the
fact that yt+1 is active in both Qt+1(w) and Q(yt, I;w), and all the men in {xit+2, . . . , yt+2}
are active in Qt+1(w) after yt+1, 2 applied to each of them, implies that they are also active in
Q(yt+1, yt, I;w). Hence, for this case, the hypothesis is proved for yt+1.
If yt+1 is already in N when Q(yt, I;w) is invoked, then for some tuple I
′, yt+1 should
have been added to N , during the invocation of Q(I ′;w). Thus, Q(yt+1, I
′;w) would have been
invoked prior to Q(yt, I;w). Using the same argument (on Qt+1(w) and Q(yt+1, I
′;w)) that we
used for the earlier case, we conclude that even for this case, the hypothesis holds for yt+1.
Thus, we have shown that all the men in AS′(w) are active somewhere during the execution
of the algorithm and thus, all are present in N at the end of the execution. This completes the
proof of 1.
Algorithm 1: A(Q,w), [TST01]
Input: Strategy Q, and a woman w ∈W
Output: Sets N = {m ∈M | ∃ Q′ ∈ Qw, µQ′ [w] = m}, and
L = {Q(m, I;w) | m ∈ N, Q′=(Q(−w), Q(m, I;w)), µQ′ [w] = m}
1 Let x1 be the first active man in Q(w);
2 Let N ←− {x1} and L←− {Q(x1;w)};
3 Explore(Q(x1;w));
Procedure Explore(Q(x;w))
Let A←− {men who are active in Q(x;w) after x};
foreach y ∈ A \N do
N ←− N ∪ {y} and L←− L ∪ {Q(y, x;w)};
Explore(Q(y, x;w));
return (N,L);
4 Algorithm for P -Stable Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we consider the problem of deciding, for a given true preference P , and stated
preference Q, whether Q is P -stable Nash equilibrium. We show that this problem is solvable
in time O(n4). Algorithm 2 uses Algorithm 1 as a subroutine.
To show the correctness of Algorithm 2, the following lemma plays a key role.
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Algorithm 2: Algorithm for testing P -stable Nash equilibrium
Input: True strategy P , stated strategy Q, and the set of women W .
Output: Answers “Yes”, if Q is a P -stable Nash equilibrium, else “No”.
foreach w ∈W do
Run Algorithm 1 to obtain Nw(Q) and Lw(Q);
Let N ′ ←− {m ∈ Nw(Q) s.t. w prefers m to µQ[w] w.r.t P (w)};
foreach m ∈ N ′ do
Let Q(m, I;w) ∈ Lw(Q) be the list that yields (m,w) as a matched pair;
Compute µ, the men-optimal stable matching for (Q(−w), Q(m, I;w));
if µ is P -stable then
return “No”;
return “Yes”;
Lemma 4. Suppose that Q is an arbitrary (unilateral) manipulation strategy of woman w. Then
for any (fixed) man m, a Q-stable matching (if any) that matches m to w, is unique.
Proof. Let Q be an arbitrary manipulation strategy by which w attains m, and let µ denote the
men-optimal stable matching for Q.
Algorithm 1 computes a list Q(m, I;w), such that w attains m by the strategy Q∗ =
(Q(−w), Q(m, I;w)). Note that m appears at the front of the list Q∗(w) = Q(m, I;w). Let µ∗
be the men-optimal stable matching for Q∗. Our goal is to show that µ = µ∗.
Claim 1. For each m, µ∗[m] ≥ µ[m], in Q(m).
Proof. We begin by showing that µ is Q∗-stable. Note that µ is Q-stable, and Q and Q∗ differ
only in w’s list. Hence, if there is a Q∗-blocking pair in µ, then it must contain w. However,
this is impossible since w is matched with m, who is at the front of the list Q∗(w). Therefore,
µ must be Q∗-stable.
Since µ∗ is the man-optimal stable matching for Q∗ and µ is a Q∗-stable matching, conse-
quently, for each man m ∈ M : µ∗[m] ≥ µ[m], in Q∗(m). Since Q∗(m) = Q(m), for each man
m, the claim is proved.
Claim 2. For each m, µ[m] ≥ µ∗[m], in Q(m).
Proof. We will show that µ∗ is Q-stable. Suppose that it is not. Then there is Q-blocking
pair in µ∗, and it includes w for the same reason as in the proof of 1. Let (m′, w) denote a
Q-blocking pair. Then w > µ∗[m′], in Q(m′), and m′ > µ∗[w], in Q(w).
By 1, m′ prefers w to µ[m′], and recall that µ∗[w] = µ[w] = m. Hence, (m′, w) is a Q-
blocking pair in µ, a contradiction. Again, for the same reason as in the proof of 1, we can
conclude that µ[m] ≥ µ∗[m], in Q(m), for each man m.
By Claims 1 and 2, µ[m] = µ∗[m] for each man m. Thus, µ = µ∗, completing the proof of
4.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 2 solves our Problem in O(n4) time.
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Proof. For each woman, Algorithm 2 runs Algorithm 1 whose time complexity is O(n3). The
size of set N is at most n, and Algorithm 2 runs GS-M, whose time complexity is O(n2), on
(Q(−w), Q(m;w)) for each m ∈ N . Therefore, its running time is O(n3) for each woman. Since
there are n women, the total running time of Algorithm 2 is O(n4).
Suppose that Algorithm 1 outputs “No”. Then, it implies that a P -stable manipulation
strategy was found by Algorithm 1, and therefore Q is not P -stable Nash equilibrium. For the
opposite direction, suppose that Q is not a P -stable Nash equilibrium and there exists a woman
w who has a P -stable manipulation strategy Q′. Then µQ′[w] is added to N when Algorithm 1
is run for w, and by 4 the matching µQ′ is uniquely defined. Since µQ′ is P -stable, Algorithm 2
must output “No.”
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